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Abstract
Many economic problems can be formulated as dynamic games in which strategically in-
teracting agents choose actions that determine the current and future levels of a single
capital stock. We study necessary conditions that allow us to characterise Markov per-
fect Nash equilibria for these games. These conditions result in an auxiliary system of
ordinary differential equations that helps us to explore stability, continuity and differentia-
bility of these equilibria. The techniques are used to derive detailed properties of Markov-
perfect Nash equilibria for several games including the exploitation of a ﬁnite resource,
the voluntary investment in a public capital stock, and the inter-temporal consumption of
a reproductive asset.
JEL classiﬁcation C73, D92, Q22
Keywords: Capital accumulation games, Markov equilibria, Resource games, Differential
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1 Introduction
Many economic problems can be formulated as dynamic games in which strategically interact-
ing agents choose actions that determine the current and future levels of a single capital stock.
Consider, for example, a single stock of an exhaustible or reproductive resource that is simul-
taneously exploited by several agents that do not cooperate. Each agent chooses an extraction
strategy to maximise the discounted stream of future utility. The actions taken by agents not
only determine their levels of utility but also the level of the capital stock. Alternatively, look
at the problem that agents voluntarily contribute to a single public stock of capital, like a park
or a church. They choose their contributions (investments in the public stock of capital) to
maximise the discounted stream of utility from consuming the public stock net of investment
costs. Private investment builds up the public stock of capital that eventually can be consumed
by all agents.
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1Both examples have several things in common. First, the actions taken by agents de-
termine the size of a single capital stock that fully describes the current state of the economic
system. Second, if there is no mechanism that forces players to coordinate their actions, they
will act strategically and play a non-cooperative game. Third, the equilibrium outcome will
critically depend on the strategy spaces available to the agents.
We make use of these features and formulate a differential game in which agents act non-
cooperatively and use Markov strategies. We provide a detailed analysis of Markov perfect
Nash equilibria (MNPE) for this class of differential games with a single capital stock and
discuss several economic examples that belong to this class.
In a differential game, strategically interacting agents try to maximise an inter-temporal
objective function by choosing a strategy that results in an action at every point in time.1 Col-
lectively, these actions inﬂuence the state of the economic system and its time evolution.
There is a wide choice of possible strategies taken by the agents. They may choose a
simple time proﬁle of actions and precommit themselves to these ﬁxed actions over the entire
planning horizon: the players are then using open-loop strategies. Alternatively players might
choose Markov strategies where they condition their actions on the current state of the system
and react immediately every time the state variable changes. When agents use feedback or
Markov strategies they are not required to precommit. Instead they play credible strategies if
these are derived through backward induction.
To better understand the difference between open-loop and Markov strategies let us look
at the following example of several agents strategically exploiting the same renewable resource,
like for instance a stock of ﬁsh. If the ﬁsheries use open-loop strategies they specify a time
path of ﬁshing effort at the beginning of the game and commit themselves to stick to these
preannounced actions over the entire planning horizon. Alternatively, if they use Markov or
feedback strategies they choose decision rules that determine current actions as a function
of the current stock of the resource. Markov decision rules capture the strategic interactions
present in a dynamic game. If a rival ﬁshery makes a catch today that necessarily results in a
lower level of the ﬁsh stock, the opponents react with actions that take this change in the stock
into account. In that sense Markov strategies capture all the features of strategic interactions.
Assuming that agents use Markov strategy spaces we restrict our attention to the deriva-
tion of subgame perfect Nash equilibria. Within a differential game framework these strategies
have the property that players choose a state dependent decision rule that for every subgame as-
signs an equilibrium action to the current state of the economic system. Finding Markov Nash
equilibrium strategies of differential games, even if the game is of the linear-quadratic type, is
a formidable analytical problem. For instance, to ﬁnd a Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium in
the general situation of n players and m state variables leads to the problem of determining
solutions of a system of n coupled nonlinear implicit m-dimensional partial differential equa-
tions (PDE). Only if the economic system can be described by a single state variable (a single
capital stock) will the system of PDE’s collapse to a system of ordinary differential equations
that is much easier to deal with. Because of this, the paper focuses on the least complex situ-
ation m = 1. There are many economic problems that result in a dynamic game with a single
capital stock.
Consider for instance n agents non-cooperatively exploiting a single exhaustible or re-
newable resource. The resource stock is the single state variable and agents choose extraction
1For a general introduction to the theory of differential games we refer the reader to Dockner et al. (2000).
2strategies to maximise the present value of utility over a given planning horizon. Markov per-
fect equilibria for these classes of games have been derived in many places, see for example
Levhari and Mirman (1980), Sundaram (1989), Benhabib and Radner (1992), Clemhout and
Wan (1994), Dutta and Sundaram (1993), Dockner and Sorger (1996), Rinc´ on-Zapatero et al.
(1998) and more recently Benchekroun (2003).
As a second class of models consider private investment in a public capital stock. The
capital stock is the single state variable and agents choose investment strategies to maximise the
present value of future net utility. Utility is derived from the available stock of public capital.
This problem of private investment in a single public stock of capital has been formulated by
Fershtman and Nitzan (1991) and Markov-perfect Nash equilibria have been studied by Wirl
(1996) and Rowat (2007), and in a discrete time framework by Marx and Matthews (2000) and
Dockner and Nishimura (2005).
Dynamic games with a single capital stock can also be applied to study transbound-
ary pollution control. The emissions of two or more countries accumulate a single stock of
pollution. Countries derive utility from consumption but production results in emissions that
accumulate and generate costs. Markov equilibria for these types of games have been studied
by van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw (1992), Dockner and Long (1994) and Dockner et al. (1996).
Finally, environmentaleconomistshaverecentlystartedtoexploreequilibriaintheshallowlake
problem. This problem is structurally similar to the exploitation of a single renewable resource
stock but with a non-concave production function. Recent papers dealing with the shallow lake
problem include Brock and Starrett (2003), M¨ aler et al. (2003), and Wagener (2003). A numer-
ical analysis of a Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium in the shallow lake problem has been given
by Kossioris et al. (2008).
In this paper we formulate a class of differential games in which the actions of the agents
inﬂuence a single capital stock, the state variable, and develop a solution methodology whose
core is formed by necessary conditions that have to be satisﬁed by Markov strategies. If the
economic system is described by a single state variable standard dynamic programming tech-
niques to derive Markov-perfect Nash equilibria result in a system of ordinary differential equa-
tions in the value function. For a restricted class of speciﬁc functional forms of the primitives
of the model this system of differential equations can be solved explicitly and the Markov-
perfectNashequilibriumcanbederivedanalytically. StartingwiththepioneeringworkbyCase
(1979), differential game theorists have modiﬁed this approach. Instead of working with the
ordinary differential equations in the value functions, they derive a system of differential equa-
tions in shadow prices, that is, in the ﬁrst derivatives of the value functions. Structurally this
system is much simpler to work with, in particular when symmetric equilibrium strategies are
analysed. For the shadow price system reduces then to a single quasi-linear2 differential equa-
tion with non-constant state dependent coefﬁcients, which for speciﬁc functional forms of the
state equation and the objective functionals can be solved explicitly.
Using the shadow price system approach, Tsutsui and Mino (1990) derive non-linear
Markov equilibria for a linear quadratic differential game. The same approach was used
by Dockner and Long (1994) in a model of transboundary pollution control and by Wirl (1996)
in a public goods investment problem. For a differential game with m state variables and n
players, Rinc´ on-Zapatero et al. (1998) give a general formulation of the shadow price system
approach to derive Markov-perfect Nash equilibria. They differentiate the Bellman equations
2A differential equation is called quasi-linear if it is linear in the highest derivatives of the unknown function.
3to arrive at a system of quasi-linear partial differential equations in the shadow prices and point
out that if there is only a single state variable this system reduces to a linear system of ordinary
differential equations. Using an example with exhaustible resources they derive analytical so-
lutions for symmetric Markov-perfect Nash equilibria for constant elasticity utility functions.
Finally, Kossioris et al. (2008) apply the shadow price system approach in the area of environ-
mental economics.
This paper extends the shadow price system approach in a substantial way for n-player
games with a single state variable. The n-dimensional system of ordinary quasi-linear non-
autonomous differential equations in shadow prices is used to derive an auxiliary (n + 1)-
dimensional system of ordinary autonomous differential equations whose solution trajectories
trace out graphs of the equilibrium strategies. The auxiliary system opens up the opportunity to
use phase diagram analysis and study Markov-perfect Nash equilibria for games with general
functionalforms. Moreover, itcanbeusedtogainimportantinsightsintothecontinuityanddif-
ferentiability of Markovian strategies. We are able to derive necessary conditions for possible
failures of differentiability and continuity of the Markov equilibrium strategies. Points where
the Markov strategies are continuous but not differentiable can very conveniently be described
by singularities of the auxiliary system. Moreover, we are also able to ﬁnd non-continuous
Markov-perfect Nash strategy equilibria.
In the important special case that all players have the same utility functionals, it is useful
to focus on a symmetric equilibrium in which all agents play the same strategy. The symmetric
equilibrium is the solution of an ordinary ﬁrst order non-autonomous differential equation. It
is possible to draw the phase diagram of the associated two-dimensional autonomous auxiliary
system, which yields detailed information about the qualitative properties of the symmetric
Markov equilibrium.
The article is organised as follows. Section 2 serves as an introduction to the central
ideas of the paper, which are presented in the context of the Fershtman-Nitzan model of vol-
untary provisions to a public good. In section 3, necessary conditions are derived which have
to hold at points where a Markov strategy is differentiable, or continuous, or discontinuous,
respectively. Section 4 illustrates these conditions by determining Markov equilibria for differ-
ent applications of differential games with a single capital stock: (i) extraction of exhaustible
resources; (ii) management of an economical-ecological system, known as the shallow lake
system; and (iii) exploitation of renewable resources. Section 5 concludes.
2 Example: voluntary provision of a public good
This section introduces our approach to ﬁnding Markov-perfect Nash equilibria for differential
games with a single capital stock by applying it to a linear-quadratic differential game.
The model that will serve as example is the analysis of private investment in a public
capital stock. This game was ﬁrst treated by Fershtman and Nitzan (1991). They assumed that
each agent derives quadratic utility from the consumption of the public capital stock. Invest-
ment in the stock, however, is costly and results in quadratic adjustment costs. Fershtman and
Nitzan solved both the open-loop game and the game with Markov strategies and found that
the dynamic free rider problem is more severe when agents use linear Markov strategies. Wirl
(1996) challenged these results and studied the identical linear quadratic game but solved it
for non-linear Markov equilibria. He found that if the discount rate is small enough non-linear
4Markov strategies can support equilibrium outcomes that are close to the efﬁcient provision of
the public capital. Finally, Rowat (2007) derived explicit analytic expressions for the non-linear
Markov equilibria. We shall use this example to introduce our methodology.
2.1 The game
There are n players; player i voluntarily invests in the public capital stock at the rate ui. The





here δ > 0 is the constant depreciation rate. Following Fershtman and Nitzan we assume that















where a,b > 0 are positive parameters. Note that compared to the formulation of Wirl (1996),
one parameter has been scaled away. The corresponding present value Pontryagin function3
becomes















Contributions to the public good are assumed to be nonnegative: ui ≥ 0. The function ui 7→
Pi(x,pi,u) is maximised at
ui = vi(pi) =

pi pi ≥ 0,
0 pi < 0.
Introduce ˆ ui = (u1,··· ,ui−1,ui+1,··· ,un). The present value Hamilton function Hi of
player i reads then as
Hi(x,pi, ˆ ui) =

      



























We now restrict our attention to the symmetric case, for which all players use the same strat-
egy. If V is the common value function of the players, using pi(x) = V 0(x) we obtain,
following Fershtman and Nitzan (1991), the Hamilton-Jacobi equation for V . If V 0 ≥ 0, this
equation reads as






(V 0)2 − δxV 0. (1)
3Also called Hamilton, pre-Hamilton or unmaximised Hamilton function.
5Fershtman and Nitzan obtained a solution to this equation by the well-known method of sub-
stituting V (x) = c0 + c1x + c2x2 and comparing coefﬁcients of x.
Wirl (1996) pointed out that due to the fact that the Hamilton-Jacobi equation (1) has
no initial conditions, there may be actually more solutions to this equation; he applied the
shadow price system approach to derive these equilibria. This approach consists of two steps:
(i) differentiating the Hamilton-Jacobi equation once with respect to x, to get
ρV 0 = a − bx + (2n − 1)V 0V 00 − δV 0 − δxV 00.
and (ii) solving for V 00 by substituting V 00 = p0 = u0 (if V 0 ≥ 0) to arrive at the shadow price
system,
[(2n − 1)p − δx]p0 = (ρ + δ)p − a + bx. (2)
Note that while equation (1) was an implicit nonlinear ﬁrst order ordinary differential equa-
tion in V , equation (2) is an explicit quasi-linear equation in p with non-constant coefﬁcients.
Rowat (2007) derives an explicit solution for this quasi-linear differential equation by carefully
considering the singularity where (2n − 1)p − δx = 0 holds. We do not repeat his approach
here but refer to his paper instead.
The idea of our approach is to reformulate the shadow price system and to derive an
auxiliary system from (2). In the region p ≥ 0 this system is given by
dp
ds
= (ρ + δ)p − a + bx,
dx
ds
= (2n − 1)p − δx.
Note that the derivatives are taken with respect to a parameter s which has no a priori economic
interpretation; the point of the auxiliary system is that a solution (x(s),p(s)) traces out the















(ρ + δ)p − a + bx
(2n − 1)p − δx
, (3)
which corresponds to equation (2). Some phase curves of the auxiliary system are shown in
ﬁgure 1. There, solutions of the auxiliary system are represented by drawn curves. They can,
at least locally, be interpreted as the graphs of possible symmetric feedback strategies u(x) =
p(x).
2.2 Geometrical analysis of feedback equilibria
In this subsection, the solutions of the auxiliary system are analysed geometrically by investi-





np − δx, p ≥ 0,
− δx, p < 0.
(4)
Excluded trajectories. In ﬁgure 1, note the region in the lower right hand corner. Any solu-
tion of the auxiliary system intersects (under the dynamics of the state equation) the line l2 :
(2n−1)p−δx = 0. As this is also, not coincidentally, the curve of minima of the value func-
tion for given x, the strategies cannot ‘jump away’ from l2 (see subsection 3.4 for conditions on

















Figure 1: Solutions of the auxiliary system (drawn curves) as well as the line of equilibria l1 :
dx/dt = 0 (thickly dashed line) and the isocline l2 : dx/ds = 0 of the auxiliary system
(thinly dashed line). Parameters: a = 0.1, b = 0.1, δ = 0.2, ρ = 0.1.
7non-continuous strategy equilbria). Neither can the strategies stay there, for none of the points
on l2, excluding the origin, is an equilibrium of the state equation (4). Finally, continuation
along solutions of the auxiliary system is impossible as well, as the trajectories bend back, they
cannot represent univalent functions of the state variable any more.
Solutions for which there exists a constant S > 0 such that p(s) < 0 for s ≥ S, that
is, trajectories of the auxiliary system that pass through the line p = 0 at x0 = x(s), are also
excluded. They correspond to strategies that satisfy u(x) = 0 for 0 ≤ x ≤ x0. In that region,
the costate equation of a player would take the form
dp
dt
= (ρ + δ)p − a + bx;
note that the derivative here is with respect to time, as we are considering the optimisation
problem of a single player. As u(x) = 0 implies that x(t) tends to 0, it follows that p ∝




at (x,p) = (0,0).
In the lower left hand corner of the ﬁgure, points that start at the line l2 move away from
it under state dynamics and either hit the exceptional line p = 0 or the line of steady states l1.
Theformersolutionshavetobeexcluded, astheyleadtotrajectoriesviolatingthetransversality
condition; the latter solutions of the auxiliary system represent feedback strategies that are not
deﬁned for all states.
Also, solutions along which x increases indeﬁnitely over time are to be excluded. This
cannot always be done on the basis of a transversality argument, but we have to invoke a global
argument. For x(t) sufﬁciently large, both terms ax − 1
2bx2 and −1
2u2 of the utility integrand
are negative. Therefore along an indeﬁnitely increasing solution it is always better for a player
to play the deviating strategy u = 0. We end up with a substantially reduced set of strategies,
shown in ﬁgure 2.
Corner points. The feedback strategy that is formed by the upper two invariant manifolds
of the steady state P of the auxiliary system is of the ‘kink’ or ‘corner’ type mentioned below
in subsection 3.3. Note that the corner point is on the line l2, as predicted. Also the globally
deﬁned strategy, thickly drawn in ﬁgure 2, has a corner: it is located at the point where the
invariant manifold of P intersects the horizontal axis. This corner is however of a different
kind, as it represents a control constraint that becomes active.
Stability of equilibria. Consider the line l1 = {(x,p) : f(x,p) = 0} of equilibria of
the state dynamics (the broken thickly drawn line in the ﬁgure): the quantity dx
dt is positive
above l1, and negative below. From the ﬁgure, it is readily apparent that points on l1 close to
the origin (lower left hand corner) are stable, while points on l1 in the upper right hand corner
are unstable. Hence there is a point on l1 where equilibria change from stable to unstable; it is
the unique point (x∗∗,p∗∗) where a solution curve of the auxiliary system touches the line l1.
Let p(x) be a feedback solution. The stock then evolves according to
dx
dt
= f(x,p(x)) = np(x) − δx. (5)


















Figure 2: Locally (thin curves) and globally (thick curve) deﬁned Markov-perfect Nash equilib-
rium strategies, together with the lines l1 and l2. Also indicated is the supremum ¯ x∗ of the state
values that can be stabilised by a locally deﬁned Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium strategy.
Parameters as in ﬁgure 1.
9Let x∗ be a steady state equilibrium of this equation; then we have that p∗ = p(x∗) = (δ/n)x∗











(x∗) − δ < 0.




(ρ + δ)p∗ − a + bx∗
(2n − 1)p∗ − δx∗
=
(ρ + δ) δ
nx∗ − a + bx∗













In other words, the value x∗∗ is the supremum of the stock values that can be stabilised by a
local Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium strategy. By this we mean the following.
Deﬁnition. A state x∗ ∈ X can be stabilised by a local Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium
strategy, if there is an open interval I ⊂ X containing x∗ and a Markov-perfect Nash equi-
librium strategy p : I → R such that x∗ is a stable steady state under the stock evolution
dynamics.
In the present situation we have that for every x∗ < x∗∗, there is a Markov-perfect Nash
equilibrium strategy p such that x∗ is a stable steady state under the dynamics (5).
The maximal utility stream that is extracted from the public good, that is, the maximum
of ax − 1
2bx2, is obtained at xm = b/a. Note that as the number n of players tends to inﬁnity,
the value x∗∗, and with it the region of stock values that can be stabilised, increases towards xm.
This was to be expected: as the adjustment costs are convex, it is better in terms of average
costs per player that they are distributed over more players.
Optimal strategies. From ﬁgure 1 we can also draw conclusions to which strategies max-
imise the pay–off for the players, if the initial state x0 = x(0) of the system is given; we obtain
from equation (1) that






p2 − δxp = G(x,p). (6)
In ﬁgure 3 we added the level curves of G to the strategies of ﬁgure 2 as dotted lines. Note
that G, and hence V , is large if for instance p is large.
Consider ﬁrst the case that x0 = 0. Then




and we see that the highest payoff is attained if p is chosen as large as is feasible; from ﬁgure 3
we infer that this corresponds to the strategy that ends at the semi-stable steady state x = x∗∗.
In general, for ﬁxed x, the function p 7→ G(x,p) is convex and takes its minimum
if (x,p) ∈ l2. It follows that to maximise payoff for all players, the initial value of p has to
be taken as large as is feasible for x ≤ xP. Beyond that point, the solutions with maximal p
have to be compared with the globally deﬁned strategy. For x sufﬁciently large, there is only a
single candidate, which is necessarily optimal.


















Figure 3: As ﬁgure 2, but with the level sets of G added (dotted curves), from which the payoff
of the strategies can be determined.
112.3 General formulation of a symmetric game
It is clarifying to reformulate the derivation of the auxiliary equations in terms of the game
Hamiltonian G, introduced in equation (6).








The shadow price system takes the form
∂G
∂p

















Mathematically speaking, these equations are the characteristic equations of the Hamilton-
Jacobi equation (6). However, in crucial contrast to the “one-player” optimal control situation,
the parameter s is different from the time parameter t. In a way, it is this fact that allows the
occurrence of “many” Nash equilibrium strategies.
3 General theory
In this section we derive the auxiliary system for general feedback Nash equilibria in a dynamic
game with a single state variable. In this game, n players choose Markov strategies, ui(x), to
maximise an inter-temporal objective function. The strategies determine the level of a single
capital stock, x, that is governed by the state dynamics. For this game we characterise Markov
perfect Nash equilibria that are either differentiable, or continuous, or have at most a ﬁnite
number of jump points.
Recall that such an equilibrium is by deﬁnition a vector–valued function u : X → Rn,
such that if the strategies of all players except player i are given by the component func-
tions uj(x), j 6= i, then ui(x) would be the optimal feedback control for player i of the
resulting optimal control problem.
3.1 The vector Hamilton-Jacobi equation.





Here x ∈ X, where X is an open subinterval of the real line R, and u denotes the vector u =




determines the evolution of the system.
12Introduce the notation ˆ ui = (u1,··· ,ui−1,ui+1,··· ,un) for the vector of strategies of
all players except player i. Given these strategies in feedback form ˆ ui = ˆ ui(x), the Pontryagin
function of player i reads as
Pi(x,pi, ˆ ui,ui) = Li(x,u) + pif(x,u).
This function is maximised at
ui = vi(x,pi, ˆ ui) (9)
yielding the Hamilton function
Hi(x,pi, ˆ ui) = Pi (x,pi, ˆ ui,vi(x,pi, ˆ ui)).
The Hamilton-Jacobi equation for the value function of player i reads then as
ρVi(x) = Hi(x,V 0
i (x), ˆ ui(x)).








































etc. In order to eliminate the functions ui(x) from the problem, the system of equations
Fi(x,u) = ui − vi(x,pi, ˆ ui) = 0, i = 1,··· ,n (10)
has to be solved for the ui; in vector notation, this system reads as
F(x,u) = u − v(x,p,u) = 0.






should be invertible. We make therefore the general assumption that this inversion is always
possible, and ﬁnd solutions ui = ui(x,p).
Consequently, it may be assumed that the game Hamilton functions Gi, i = 1,··· ,n of
the players can be written as
Gi = Gi(x,V 0
1,··· ,V 0
n) = Hi(x,V 0
i , ˆ ui(x,V0(x))),
and that we are to solve the following vector Hamilton-Jacobi equation
ρV(x) = G(x,V0(x)) = H(x,V0(x),u(x,V0(x))), (11)




































Equation (13) or (14) is referred to as the the shadow price system. Due to the special structure
of our class of games the shadow price system is a system of quasi-linear differential equations
in p(x). Rinc´ on-Zapatero et al. (1998) analyse this general system and demonstrate its ap-
plicability by considering speciﬁc examples. As already pointed out the shadow price system
approach traces back to the analysis of Case (1979) who studied non-linear Markov equilibria
for the sticky price model also analysed in detail by Tsutsui and Mino (1990). The shadow
price system approach has also been applied by Dockner and Long (1994) and by Wirl (1996)
to derive non-linear symmetric Markov-perfect Nash equilibria.
Note that if the relation u = u(x,p) can be solved for p, say by p = q(x,u), then
we can rewrite equation (14) in terms of the controls u, which is often more convenient in
applications.
Note further that in the important symmetric special case that all players are equal and








and equations (11)-(13) now hold as scalar equations with G replaced by G.
3.2 Auxiliary system.
Recall the deﬁnition of the adjoint matrix A∗ of a given matrix A: it is the matrix whose
elements are the cofactors of A, which are obtained by deleting the i’th row and j’th column
of A and taking the determinant of the remaining matrix. We have that AA∗ = (detA)I,
where I is the identity matrix; hence A−1 = (detA)−1A∗. Multiplying an equation of the
form
Ax = b
from the left with A∗ yields
(detA)x = A∗b.














































where s ∈ R is some real parameter that has no immediate economic signiﬁcance.

















Note again, though, that the parameter s is not the time.
3.3 Corner points.
Equation (13) answers the question of when a continuous equilibrium Markov strategy u(x)
may fail to be differentiable at certain (isolated) points.
Theorem 1. Assume that p = p(x) is a Markov Nash equilibrium costate of the differential
game with payoffs (7) and state equation (8). If p is continuous in a neighborhood U of x0,
and if det ∂G
















Under the hypotheses of the theorem, the matrix ∂G/∂p(x,p(x)) is invertible on a neighbour-















Hence p is differentiable with the stated derivative.
Thisresultsuggestsimmediatelyanecessarycriterionfortheoccurrenceofcornerpoints
in Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium strategies.
Theorem 2. Under the same assumptions as theorem 1, if p is differentiable in U\{x0} and
det ∂G

















15Consequently, a strategy vector p(x) can have a corner point at x = x0 if and only if the
point (x0,p(x0)) is an equilibrium point of the auxiliary system.
The proof of this result is immediate.
3.4 Jump points
Note that theorem 1 yields a necessary condition at points where the equilibrium costates are
continuous. Here, we look for necessary conditions that have to hold if the equilibrium strategy
has an isolated jump discontinuity.
Let p(x) = (p1(x),··· ,pn(x)) be the vector of costates, and let u = u(x,p(x)) be the
corresponding vector of feedback strategies. The result can then be stated as follows.











Note that it is possible to give a priory conditions that ensure the continuity of the value func-
tion Vi.
Proof
This is a direct consequence of the equation
ρVi(x) = Gi(x,p(x))
together with the continuity of Vi.
Remarks.
1. In the symmetric case, if the game Hamilton function G(x,p) is convex in p, then
there are at most two solutions to the equation G(x,p) = c, and consequently for
given (x0,p0), there is only one candidate value of p to “jump to”.
2. If all value functions are continuous, and given a point (x0,p0), the possible values of p
to “jump to” are solutions of the system of equations
G(x0,p) = G(x0,p0).
3. Let u(x) be deﬁned for all x < x0, and assume that there is only one possibility for a
nonzero jump at x0, to a continuous strategy ˜ u(x) deﬁned for all x ≥ x0. Let
lim
x↑x0
f(x,u(x)) = A, and lim
x↓x0
f(x, ˜ u(x)) = f(x0, ˜ u(x0)) = B.
If the time evolution x(t) is continuous and piecewise differentiable, then it is not pos-
sible that simultaneously A > 0 and B < 0. For, suppose it were the case. Then
if x(t0) = x0, necessarily x(t) = x0 for all t > t0. Hence B should be equal to 0,
contradicting the assumption.
164 Applications
The class of differential games introduced in the preceding section is fairly general and allows
us to study Markov equilibria for a variety of different examples. Here we apply the techniques
of the auxiliary system to three alternative models that have been dealt with in the literature:
(i) the exploitation of an exhaustible resource (Eswaran and Lewis 1984, Clemhout and Wan
1994, Rinc´ on-Zapatero et al. 1998), (ii) the shallow lake problem (M¨ aler et al. 2003, Brock and
Starrett 2003, Wagener 2003) and (iii) the exploitation of a reproductive asset (Benhabib and
Radner 1992, Dockner and Sorger 1996, Benchekroun 2003).
4.1 Exploitation of exhaustible assets.
Let x be the stock of some exhaustible resource, and let ui be player i’s rate of exploitation of





where Li(ui) is the instantaneous utility that exhibits positive and decreasing marginal utility.
The stock dynamics of the resource is described by




The function Pi is given by




yielding pi = L0
i(ui) ≡
dLi(ui)
dui if ui > 0, and pi = 0 if ui = 0. This equation is solved
by ui = vi(pi). Substitution into (18) yields




Restricting the analysis to symmetric agents for which L1 = ··· = Ln = L and symmetric
equilibria, we obtain the game Hamiltonian
G(p) = L(v(p)) − npv(p).
Equation (13) then takes the form
 
L0v0 − nv − npv0
p0(x) = ρp.
Using that p = L0(v(p)) and v0(p) = 1/L00(v(p)), and taking out a factor v, transforms this to






Switching to controls rather than costates, taking into account the relation
p0(x) = L00(u(x))u0(x)
17yields ﬁnally




















In the ﬁrst speciﬁc example of this model we will demonstrate the use of the shadow prices
instead of the auxiliary system. This is motivated by the fact that under the assumption of a
constant elasticity utility function the shadow price system is fully integrable.
The shadow price system (19) reduces to a simple ordinary differential equation when
either preferences with constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) or with constant absolute risk
aversion (CARA) together with symmetric equilibria are assumed (see Rinc´ on-Zapatero et al.
1998).
Let us consider the case of constant relative risk aversion ﬁrst. Here the utility functions























which is solved by either u(x) = 0, or, if n > 1/(1 − η), by the linear function
u(x) = Ax, where A =
ρ
(1 − η)n − 1
.
This is the symmetric Nash equilibrium strategy for all players; note that in equilibrium, the
rate of extraction A is proportional to the discount rate, and it decreases with the number
of players. In the limiting case when agents have logarithmic utility, Li(ui) = lnui and the
elasticitybecomesE(u) = 1, extractionratesareindependentofthenumberofﬁrmsexploiting
the resource. They are given by u(x) = ρx.
In case of constant absolute risk aversion, consumer preferences are given by
Li(ui) = −e−αui





and equation (19) becomes












Under the assumptions that u(0) = 0 this equation can be integrated to yield equilibrium
extraction rates equal to
u(x) =
(n − 1) +
p
(1 − n)2 + 2ρnαx
nα
.
The integration is especially clear when performed using the auxiliary system (20), which in














This can be easily integrated to yield
u(s) = u0 +
ρ
α










It follows that the solution curves of the auxiliary system are a family of parabolas. For u0 = 0








Solving this equation for u results in the explicit solution given above. These equilibrium
strategies are decreasing both in the number of ﬁrms exploiting the resource and in the level of
absolute risk aversion.
4.2 Shallow lake.
Consider the following environmental problem. There are n players (countries, communes,
farmers) sharing a shallow lake. Each player has revenues from farming, for which artiﬁcial
fertiliser is used. The use of fertiliser has two opposing effects: more fertiliser means better
harvests and hence higher revenues from farming. On the other hand fertiliser is washed from
the ﬁelds by rainfall and eventually accumulates a stock of phosphorus in the shallow lake. The
higher the level of phosphorus the higher are the costs (for fresh water, decreased income from
tourism) to the player. Since the level of the stock of phosphorus is the result of activities of
all players sharing the lake, the resulting problem can best be described by a differential game.
The shallow lake system has been investigated in detail by Dechert and Brock (2000), M¨ aler
et al. (2003), Wagener (2003); we refer to these papers for background information.














Figure 4: Solutions of the auxiliary system (solid) and level curves ofthe value function (dotted)
in the symmetric two player case of the shallow lake game. The highlighted curve is a globally
deﬁned non-continuous Nash feedback strategy, jumping at the state xi.
Let the stock variable x represent the amount of phosphorus in a shallow lake and let ui
be the amount of fertiliser used by farmer i. Assuming a concave technology to produce farm-





(logui − cx2)e−ρt dt.
The level of phosphorus is assumed to evolve according to the following state equation:
˙ x = f(x,u) =
n X
i=1




where we have a constant rate of self-puriﬁcation (sedimentation, outﬂow) and the nonlinear
term x2/(x2 + 1) is the result of biological effects in the lake.
For this differential game the function Pi is given by










Maximising over ui yields that ui = −1/pi. Restricting again our attention to symmetric
strategies, we ﬁnd on setting pj = p for all j = 1,··· ,n that




























= (ρ + b)p + 2cx −
2px
(x2 + 1)2,












= −(ρ + b)u + 2cu2x +
2ux
(x2 + 1)2.
Solutions to the auxiliary system are given in ﬁgure 4. The most important feature of the
solution set is that there is a globally deﬁned non-continuous Nash feedback strategy, indicated
by a thick line in the ﬁgure. Indeed, it has been known for some time that the Hamilton-Jacobi
equation of some economic optimal control problems may have jumps in the policy function,
see Skiba (1978), and for the shallow lake model M¨ aler et al. (2003) and Wagener (2003).
Since the game Hamilton-Jacobi equation for the case of two or more players is identical to
that of the one player case, the same jump occurs. Note that the feedback Nash strategies that
are parametrised by parts of the stable and unstable manifolds of one of the saddle points of
the auxiliary system are continuous, but not continuously differentiable everywhere.
Finally notice that the auxiliary system does not depend on the number of agents, and
therefore coincides with the state–control system of the shallow lake optimal control problem.
In practical terms, this means that ﬁgure 4 can be used to analyse the situation for any number
of players. The only difference is in the symmetric time dynamics
˙ x = nu − bx +
x2
1 + x2.
Increasing the number of players n leads to a decrease of the isocline ˙ x = 0. In particular,
though this will not be demonstrated here, for large values of n no states in the ‘clean’ region
can be stabilised by a locally deﬁned feedback Nash equilibrium strategy.
4.3 Exploitation of reproductive assets.
As the ﬁnal example consider the problem where n agents strategically exploit a single repro-
ductive asset, like ﬁsh or other species (see Dockner and Sorger 1996). The reproduction of
the stock x occurs at rate h(x), whereas player i extracts the stock at rate ui. Hence, the state
dynamics is given by




Let us assume that the instantaneous utility that agent i derives from the consumption of the
stock is given by
Li(u1,··· ,un)





This functional covers several cases. The ﬁsh catch can be sold in an imperfect output market.
In that case the price of the ﬁsh depends on the total quantity produced by all ﬁsheries and
therefore the function Li(u) depends on the extraction rates of all players. In case of a duopoly
market with linear demand this problem was studied in Benchekroun (2003).
Alternatively, the function Li(u) can only depend on the exploitation rate of player i. In
this case each agents maximises the present value of future utility derived from consuming the
ﬁsh. This formulation was dealt with in Dockner and Sorger (1996).
4.3.1 Oligopoly.
Let us start with the duopoly model studied by Benchekroun (2003); actually we shall treat the
general oligopoly model, as this involves no additional complexity. That is, there are n agents









Moreover, the production function is speciﬁed as
h(x) =
(
δx for x ≤ 1
2
δ(1 − x) for x > 1
2.
Note that the production function h is piecewise linear and the utility function is quadratic:
the problem can be seen as two linear-quadratic subproblems glued together. The analysis is










The function Pi is given by











This yields for i = 1,··· ,n that




Solving this system of linear equations for the ui yields that
ui =





22Restrictingtothesymmetriccasereducesthistou = (a−p)/(b(n+1)). SubstitutioninPi = P
and simpliﬁcation yields the game Hamiltonian
G =
(a − n2p)(a − p)
(n + 1)2b
+ ph(x).

















= (ρ − h0(x))p

























Given the assumption on the production function, marginal product is piecewise constant,
























Globally deﬁned strategy. Since the oligopoly game is of linear quadratic type, it makes
sense to look for a linear Markov equilibrium. The linear equilibrium, however, cannot be
applied for the entire state space. Whenever the stock level is large enough it is optimal for the
ﬁrms to chose the steady state level u0 = a/((n + 1)b) and stay at this level. Prior to reaching
this upper steady state ﬁrms can choose linear Markov strategies. They can be derived making
use of equation (22). Let us assume that in the appropriate state space range strategies are












is satisﬁed, it follows that in order to determine α and β, we can substitute for the deriva-
tives du/ds and dx/ds the expressions given in equation (22). This yields on either side
of the equality sign a linear function in x whose coefﬁcients should be equal. Equating the








= α(ρ − δ).
We ﬁnd that
α = 0 or α =
n + 1
2n2 (2δ − ρ);








2n2 (2δ − ρ)x −
a
bδ
2δ − (n2 + 1)ρ
2n2(n + 1)
. (24)




2δ − (n2 + 1)ρ
2δ − ρ
,







the optimal policy of the ﬁrms is to choose u0 = a/((n + 1)b). For intermediate levels it is
optimal to choose the linear Markov strategy given by (24). This equilibrium is illustrated in









ensure that 0 < x1 < x2 < 1/2.
Locally deﬁned strategies. As can be seen in ﬁgure 5, the piecewise linear strategy is the
only globally deﬁned Markov perfect Nash equilibrium strategy. Indicated in the ﬁgure are
also locally deﬁned Markovian equilibrium strategies. We shall determine all states that can be
stabilised by a locally deﬁned Nash equilibria.
Note that a point (x,u) = (x,u(x)) corresponds to a steady state if f(x) = h(x) −
nu(x) = 0. It corresponds to a stable steady state if moreover
f0(x) = h0(x) − nu0(x) < 0. (25)
If the graph of x 7→ u(x) is parametrised as a trajectory (x(s),u(s)) of the auxiliary vector
ﬁeld, then u0(x) = du
ds/ dx















In the region 0 < x < 1
2, where h(x) = δx and u = δx/n, this inequality can be rewritten to
δ +



















Figure 5: Solutions of the auxiliary system (solid) and level curves of the value function (dot-
ted) in the symmetric two player duopoly with production function h(x) = δ min{x,1 − x}.
Parameters are a = b = 1, δ = 2, ρ = 1/2. The highlighted curve is the piecewise linear
solution described in the text.
25If 1
2 < x < 1, then h(x) = δ(1 − x) and u = δ(1 − x)/n and inequality (26) takes the form
−δ −







b − δ(1 − x)
 < 0.
With a little straightforward algebra, we derive from this inequality the following result.
Theorem 4. If δ > (n + 1)ρ/2, then a state x ∈ (0, 1
2) is stabilisable by a locally deﬁned
Markov perfect Nash equilibrium strategy, if
0 < x <
δ − nρ










The corresponding steady state values of u satisfy
0 < u < umax
def =
δ − nρ










A state x ∈ (1




< x < 1 −
δ + nρ




The corresponding steady state values of u satisfy
δ + nρ
2δ + (n + 1)ρ
a
nb




There is an interesting economic result that follows from these propositions. Recall that in the
analogous static oligopoly game, where players act as if there is always a sufﬁcient amount of










Note that the boundary points umax and umin of the intervals of stabilisable values of u, satisfy
ucollusive = umax +
n − 1
4δ − 2(n + 1)ρ
ρ = umax + O(ρ)
and
ucollusive = umin −
n − 1
4δ + 2(n + 1)ρ
ρ = umin − O(ρ)
as ρ → 0. In other words:
Theorem 5. In the dynamic oligopoly game with n players, the collusive static exploitation
rates can never be stabilised. However, they can be realised, up to a term of order ρ, as steady
state exploitation rates of locally deﬁned Markov perfect Nash equilibrium strategies.
Actually, it is easy to show that this result is independent of the speciﬁcations of h and the
demand function.
264.3.2 Constant relative risk aversion.
We now proceed with the case in which each agent has a constant relative risk aversion utility





















From ∂Pi/∂ui we obtain pi = u−σ
i and ui = p
−1/σ
















In the symmetric case p1 = ··· = pn = p, this simpliﬁes to
G =
1 − n + nσ
1 − σ
p(σ−1)/σ + ph(x),












= (ρ − h0(x))p

















The case σ = (1 − 1/n) is special, since then the system can be integrated analytically,
yielding










Compare equation (4) of Dockner and Sorger (1996).
Stability of steady states. As above, for a given symmetric Nash equilibrium strategy u(x),
the state dynamics are given as f(x) = h(x) − nu(x). A state-control pair (x,u), with u =
u(x), corresponds to a steady state for these dynamics if f(x) = h(x) − nu = 0, that is,
27x
u
Figure 6: Solutions of the auxiliary system (solid) and the isocline ˙ x = h(x)−nu = 0 (dashed)
in the symmetric two player case of the ﬁshery model with production function h(x) = x(1−x)
and parameters ρ = 0.2 and σ = 0.8.
if u = h(x)/n. The state is locally attracting if f0(x) < 0. We compute, using the relation u =
h(x)/n:



















and to an unstable state if the inequality sign is reversed. In particular, if h0(x) < 0, then
the point (x,h(x)/n) always corresponds to an unstable equilibrium for the state dynamics.
Moreover, since the derivative h0(x) is bounded from above, if ρ > 1/n · maxh0(x) then the
state dynamics do not have stable equilibria in the interior of the state space.
Let us ﬁnally consider the “semi-stable” state ¯ x that satisﬁes
ρ = h0(¯ x)/n;
note that this point is in the boundary of the set of all stabilisable states. Compare it to the
optimal long term steady state xcollusive of the collusive outcome, for which
ρ = h0(xcollusive)
holds, the so-called “golden rule”. Note that the strategic behaviour in the semi-stable state ¯ x
can be described as each player behaving as if he had a private ﬁsh stock available with repro-
duction rate h(x)/n.
28Case study. In the following, it will be assumed that h is a twice differentiable strictly
concave function which satisﬁes h(0) = h(1) = 0. Note that this implies that h0(0) > 0,
h0(1) < 0, and that h0 is a strictly decreasing function on (0,1). In the illustrations the speciﬁ-
cation h(x) = x(1 − x) will be used.
Analysis of the auxiliary system. We shall assume that ρ ≤ h0(0). Then there is a unique











Note that the third equilibrium satisﬁes u > 0 only if n < 1/(1−σ). Solutions to the auxiliary
system are sketched in ﬁgure 6.
Lemma 1. No Markov perfect Nash equilibrium x 7→ u(x) is deﬁned on an interval that does
include the point x = 1.
Proof
We linearise the auxiliary system at (x,u) = (1,0). Introducing linearising coordinates ξ =




˙ ξ = h0(1)ξ +







The characteristic values λ1 = h0(1) and λ2 = h0(1) − ρ of this system satisfy λ2 < λ1 < 0.
To λ1 is associated the eigenvector v1 = (1,0). It follows that almost all solution trajectories
of the auxiliary system are tangent to the horizontal axis at (x,u) = (1,0).
More precise information can be obtained by the following lemma, which can be veriﬁed
by direct substitution.







where C is an integration constant. Substituting α = h0(1), β = (n(1 − σ) − 1)/σ


















The state dynamics at the equilibrium read as
˙ ξ = h0(1)ξ +










(a) σ = 0.8
x
u
(b) σ = 0.4
Figure 7: Solutions of the auxiliary system (solid) and level curves ofthe value function (dotted)
in the symmetric two player case of the ﬁshery model with production function h(x) = x(1−x)
and ρ = 0.2.
as δ > 1, it follows that ξ(t) = eh0(1)tξ0 + ···, and consequently u(t) = η(t) = η0 eδh0(1)t +
···. Recalling that p = u−σ, we ﬁnally obtain
p(t) = p0 e(ρ−h0(1))t.
Hence, as h0(1) < 0, for all solutions of the auxiliary system that tend to the equilibrium
(x0,u0) = (1,0),
the transversality condition limt→∞ p(t)e−ρt = 0 is violated.
Usingthelemma, wehavesketchedthesymmetricMarkovperfectNashequilibriainﬁg-
ure 7. A characteristic feature of these strategy equilibria is that if the initial ﬁsh stock is higher
than the semi-stable threshold value ¯ x introduced above, it cannot be stabilised. Moreover,
for these non-stabilisable initial stocks, we see that as the initial stock is larger, the eventually
reached steady state stock grows smaller.
Asymmetric strategies. Here the assumption is dropped that the players play symmetric
































































30Using the relation pi = u
−1/2
i , this system takes the form
 
h − u1 − u2 2u1
















It is convenient to consider instead of u1 and u2 the quantities v = u1 + u2 and w = u1 − u2;



















= ∆ = h2 − 2hv + w2,
dv
ds
= 2(h0 − ρ)
 




= 2(h0 − ρ)(h − v)w.
Note that the plane w = 0, corresponding to the symmetric case u1 = u2, is invariant under
the ﬂow of the auxiliary system; in other words, that case is nested in the present one.
We will not give a full analysis of this system, leaving that to future work. However,
we would like to point out one consequence of the equation ˙ w = 2(h0 − ρ)(h − v)w. Recall
that ˙ x = h − v; hence, if the system is on a time path for which the stock decreases, the factor
h − v < 0, and the sign of ˙ w/w is the opposite of h0 − ρ.
In the example above, the factor h0 −ρ is positive for small ρ and small x, and it follows
that then the differences between strategies decay exponentially if the stock decreases towards
an equilibrium close to x = 0. Conversely, if ρ sufﬁciently large, differences between strategies
increase exponentially, which can be seen as a mad scramble to exploit the last remnants of the
stock.
5 Conclusions
In this article, a framework has been elaborated to ﬁnd necessary conditions for Markov Nash
equilibrium strategies in differential games with a single state variable. The Nash equilibria
have been characterized as solutions of a system of explicit ﬁrst order ordinary differential
equations, usually nonlinear.
By analyzing a series of classical examples, we have shown that this characterization can
be used to ﬁnd both direct analytic information, by integration of the equations, and indirect
qualitative information, by a geometric analysis of the solution curves of an auxiliary system
in the phase space.
Additionally, we have addressed the issues of continuity and differentiability of Markov
strategies in this class of differential games. In particular, in the shallow lake model, we have
31shown the existence of a non-continuous Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium. Our simple ap-
proach is capable enough to deliver interesting insights into a large class of capital accumula-
tion games.
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